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Ji'cb. 
Appointed by Court. 
out 
eounsd for rPpresenting 
the ''reasonable snm" 
onlinn rily used in deter-
trans-
bet\\'een ruunsel and a soln~nt but should be 
conoidenttiou of the amounts deemed proper as 
for the services of eourt-appointed counsPl in 
nnd thP eoJnrwusation pnid to public offi-
' alH1 the rode sl'dion must also hP read in the 
relnterl such as Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, 
(h), whieh makes it the continuing duty of counst:l to 
the "defenst>lcss" rl'g·ardless of personal considera-
Evidence-Judicial Notice- Officers- Compensation.-It is 
,.,,,mlwn knowledg<' that the ('Ompensation generally paid to 
attorney;s and public defenders is substantially lower 
the amount that would be deemed appropriate for cor-
!e;::·a l work for private clients. 
[3] Law-Arraignment-Right to CounseL-If an ac-
of $1,000 in cash and had no other 
he could not be deemed a p(•rson "unable to em-
counsel'' within the puniew of Pen. Code, § 987, relating 
of accused to counsel. 
[41 Mandamus-To Courts-Application of Rules.-Jn a proceed-
mamlamus to compel the' court to allow addi-
compcnsation to court-appointed counsel for represent-
nn indigPnt defendant in a nmrdPr case, it could not be 
that such court abused its discretion in allowing' $1,000 
H'n'iePs performed by tiYo attorneys where such sum 
not he declared llYll'<'asoru1ble when compared with 
dl'<'lliNl nppropriatP for like services under like cir-
tu:nstances~ 
Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, s 187; Am.Jur., Attorneys 
1;)7. 
References: [1] Attorneys, ~ 87; [2] Evidence, § 43; 
[3j Criminal Law, 3189; [4] Mandamus, §44. 
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PHOCBBDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Humboldt County to allow additional compensation for 
seniees rendered eourt~appointed counseL 'Writ denied. 
Arthur W Ilill and Norman C. Cissna, ln pro. per., for 
Petitioners. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and 
Ji'rederiek G. Girard, Deputy Attorneys General, and Harold 
L. Hammond, District Attorney (Humboldt), for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to com-
pel the respondent court to allow ''additional compensation 
to petitioners for services and expenses" while acting as the 
court-appointed counsel for Ezra Linwood Witham. The peti-
tion was originally filed in the District Court of Appeal, which 
court issued an alternative ·writ, and ordered a reference to 
ascertain the facts. 
There is no dispute hrrc concerning the essential facts. 
Petitioners Hill and Cissna were appointed by the respondent 
court to defend \Vitham, who was charged with murder, 
assault with intent to commit murder, and kidnapping. Peti-
tioner Hill had previously represented ·witham by court 
appointment at the preliminary hearing. It is conceded that 
petitioners were experienced attorneys and prominent mem-
bers of the bar of their county; and that they ably represented 
Witham on his trial. 'l'he record before us does not show the 
precise result of the trial. Apparently Witham was convicted 
but the death sentence was not imposed. Petitioner Hill, who 
had represented ·witham at the preliminary hearing, also acted 
for him at the arraignment, and during eight days of trial and 
one night session. In addition it appears that he spent 25Vz 
hours in preparation for trial. 'l'his time included conferences 
with ·witham and his witnesses, researching legal points, and 
drawing jury instructions, but did not include time spent 
in reviewing the transcript. Petitioner Cissna performed 
somewhat similar services except for the fact that he did not 
represent \Vitham at the time of the preliminary hearing. 
Following the trial, petitioners applied to the respondent 
court for reasonable compensation under the provisions of 
section 987a of the Penal Code. They claimed that an award 
of $5,000 to each petitioner, or a total of $10,000 for both 
petitioners, would be reasonable compensation within the 
meaning of said section. After a hearing, the respondent 
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found that $500 was a "reasonable sum" to be awarded 
to petitioner, or a total of $1,000 for both petitioners, 
and ordered that amount paid from county funds. Petitioners 
then filed their petition for a writ of mandate to compel the 
allowance of a greater sum. 
The demurrer and answer to the petition have raised the 
of the availability of the writ of mandate to control 
the discretion of the respondent court. 'vVe have concluded, 
hov1ever, that regardless of the procedural question of whether 
would be available in the event of a showing of an 
abuse of discretion, no such showing has been made here, and 
the writ must be denied. 
the time involved, the pertinent provisions of section 
987a of the Penal Code read as follows: 
''In any case in which counsel is assigned in the superior 
court to defend a person who is charged therein with crime, 
... such counsel . . . shall receive a reasonable sum for com-
pensation and for necessary expenses, the amount of which 
shall be determined by the court, .... " (Stats. 1951, chap. 
1160, §2.) 
[la] The question of whether the respondent court abused 
its discretion depends upon the meaning of the phrase ''reason-
able sum" appearing in the above section. It is the theory 
of petitioners that the total award of $1,000 is so unreasonably 
small as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Their view of 
the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable sum'' is apparently 
based upon the criteria ordinarily used in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable fee in a private transaction between 
counsel and a solvent client. We are of the opinion, however, 
that such criteria are of but little assistance here, as the trans-
action is not a private transaction and the client is not a 
solvent client but one who ''is unable to employ counseL'' 
(Pen. Code, § 987.) As we view the situation, it is essentially 
one where court-appointed counsel, as officers of the court, 
perform a public service at public expense. More appropriate 
therefore, may be found by considering the amounts 
deemrd proper as compensation for the services of court-
appointed counsel in other jurisdictions, and also by consider-
ing compensation paid to public officers generally. Further-
more, section 987 a must be read in tlw light of related 
statutes, and of the history of the development of the statutory 
provi:sion~<; for the payment of compensation to appointed 
counsel. All of the foregoing factors have a bearing upon the 
legislative purpose and meaning in enacting the section. 
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provide that 
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for the com-
able sum" for their "the 
amount of vYhich shall be determined the court." ( Stats. 
1951, § 2.) It is both before the 
enactment of the section in 1941 and at all times section 
6068, subdivision , of the Butiiness and Profrssions Code 
has that "It is the . . . (h) 
to himself, 
Thus the con-
tinuing duty of counsel to "defenseless," 
regardless of personal considerations, must be in mind 
in measuring the extent of the right which the Legislature 
intended to confer upon counsel by the use of the phrase 
''reasonable sum'' in section 987 a. 
\Ve now turn to the consideration of the statutes of other 
jurisdictions providing for the compensation of court-
appointed counsel. Respondent has furnished a compilation 
of such statutes, and petitioners have not challenged its accu-
racy. It appears that in 10 states Connecticut, 
Delaware, ]'lorida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah) no is made for the 
compensation of court-appointed counsel in any case. In five 
states (Massachusetts, Mississippi, New ,Jersey, ~orth Caro-
lina, and Pennsylvania) no is made for such com-
pensation except in homicide cases. states where com-
pensation is allowed (Illinois, Iowa, lVIinnesota, Rhode 
Island, Texas, \V ashington, and a per diem fee 
for trial has been fixed by and the average per 
diem in these states is slightl~· in excess of The highest 
such per diem is provided in Minnesota and \Visconsin, where 
$50 is allowed for each trial and a lesser amonnt for each 
day spent in preparation. Stats. chap. 611.07; 
Wis. Stats. 195], § 357.26.) In 15 states where compensation 
is allowed, no fixed per diem is but the trial court 
fixes the total fee within the maximum limits permitted by 
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mny lw allowed in homi-
th,•se states than that allowed 
tllum allowed for the 
it appears that the 
in tlH•se 15 states is 
for cxpcnsPs. (New York Code 
as amended in 1949.) The next 
iu Pennsylvania. where the 
's Pa. Stats. ann., tit. 19, 
the above-mentioned 
the of $1,500 
:-; 1'\V 0 f $;j()() 
to Pem,sylnmia. Obviously, tlw 
Ll of these 15 states is 
Code of Alabama 1940, tit. J 5, 
"\ets of .\rimn:sas Art 276; Georgia 
Nov.-D,•z:. Sessiou 1D5:l, p. 478; Illiuois 
Stats. § 730; :Mississippi 
as ameHde([ 19:"50; ?\evacla $300, 
1!!4:3-1949, § 11::!.57; Ne>Y IIamp-
N. H. 1942, chap. 428, § 3; Okla-
1951, tit. 22, § 1271; Oregon $150, 
tit. 14, § 1:35.330; South Dakota $50, 
tit. :l.:t-.1901; Yirginia, $50, Colle of 
iL 14. § l±-181, as amrnclell in 1954; ·west Vir-
\Y. Ya. Colle 193.3 allno., chap. G2, § 6190; ·wyoming 
Stats. 1945, § 10-806, as amended in 
is tln1s apparent that the states last mentionrd haye 
to flx the comrwnsatiou to be paid 
eonllscl from public funds upon the same 
compensation is fixed in private transactions be-
hn'i·l! (·omJst>l and solYcnt clients. F'nrthennore, petitioners 
(·alled onr attention to any case in which the com-
of eonnsel has bceH fixed on that 
including the 14 states ·which, like 
compensation but do not prescribe by 
nxecl per diem or maximum fee. Idaho, 
:\Iary I a Jl(1, 1\Ii rh ig;Ut, l\fon tana, 
,Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
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[2] With to the compensation of public officers, 
it is a matter of common knowledge that the compensation 
generally paid to district attorneys and public defenders is 
substantially lower than the amount that would be deemed 
appropriate for corresponding legal work for private clients. 
To illustrate, it is only necessary to consider the salary 
provided at the time for the district attorney of the county 
in question, and the salary which has since been provided 
there for the newly created office of public defender. The 
salary of the district attorney was $9,000 per year, and he 
was not permitted to engage in private practice. The salary 
of the public defender is $4,800 per year, and he is permitted 
to engage in private practice, but he must maintain his 
office at his own expense for the performance of his public 
duties. 
Petitioners cite the minimum fee schedule adopted by 
the bar of their county, which prescribes a minimum fee of 
$750 for representing a defendant charged with murder, and 
a minimum fee of $250 for representing a defendant charged 
with any other felony. While such minimum fee schedule 
may have some bearing in determining appropriate com-
pensation in a private transaction between counsel and a 
solvent client, such is not the case here. [3] It should be 
noted in this connection that if the accused had been pos-
sessed of $1,000 in cash and had no other obligations, he 
could not have been deemed to be, in any fair sense of the 
term, a person "unable to employ counsel" (Pen. Code, 
§ 987) ; and more particularly in view of the above-men-
tioned duty imposed upon counsel by section 6068, sub-
division (h), of the Business and Professions Code. Is it 
reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended that the 
accused who is possessed of $1,000 should be compelled to ob-
tain private counsel out of his own funds, while the accused 
who is entirely without funds should be entitled to court-
appointed counsel who would receive compensation out of 
public funds in a much greater amount? We believe that 
the question answers itself. 
[lb] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the criteria 
to be used in determining a "reasonable sum" for compensa-
tion in this type of case are not the same as those ordinarily 
used in fixing fees for services performed as the result of a 
private transaction between counsel and a solvent client. 
On the contrary, we believe that it was intended that such 
compensation should be determined in the light of counsel's 
Feb.l956] Hrr~L 1'. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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duty to the "defenseless" (Bus. & P mf. Code, 
~ subd. (h)) ; and that the more reliable guides for the 
detennination of proper compensation for court-appointed 
under our statute are to be found by considering 
the statutory provisions of other jurisdictions for compen-
in such cases, and by considering the general level 
of compensation paid to public officers for performing legal 
in the prosecution and defense of criminal proceed-
ings. [ 4] Giving due consideration to these criteria, it can-
not said that the trial court abused its discretion in award-
ing the total sum of $1,000 for the services performed by 
·while the award of a somewhat greater amount 
have been sustained as being within the discretion of 
the trial court, it seems entirely clear that the sum awarded 
cannot be declared unreasonable when compared with the 
amonnts deemed appropriate as compensation for like ser-
Yices under like circumstances. 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory 
wriJ denied. 
C. J., Traynor, .J., and McComb, J., concurred . 
• J., concurred in the judgment. 
CAH'l'ER, .J.-I dissent. 
The major premise of the majority opinion is that the legis-
lation (Pen. Code, § 987a) requiring the payment from public 
funds of counsel appointed to defend indigent defendants 
in eri ntinal eases does not mean what it says when it specifies 
that "reasonable" fees should be allowed. It says that the 
test is not what would be reasonable if the defendant had the 
funds to employ counsel. The test giYen is something less than 
that but no other criterion is given except to compare the 
amounts allowed in other states or paid to a public defender. 
That is not and should not be the test, and, as applied here, 
the amount allowed is patently inadequate. 'l'he statute re-
I!Uire;.; that the fees be "reasonable," a question later dis-
cussed, and it was adopted in a background of much research 
and effort on the part of lawyPrs, judges and others interested 
in PndPavorillg to make real and efl'eetllal the eonst itutionally 
guara11teed right to <'Ottnsel. SPetion 987a should he 1nter-
pret in that light rath<'t" than U1Hl1•t· the t1·~t liS1~<l by the 
majority whieh is that the fee is more than Jtothing bnt Jess 
than the usual and reasonable amount becnnse various statrs 
176 HILL v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
have refused to allow a sufficient amount 
Since \Yhen has it become 
fornia must follow other states in 
tion of liberal 
however, the 
below what 
[46 C.2d 
far 
to proven 
criminals, it is the State's to ancl to 
uphold the rights of all criminal defendants until the burden 
of proof them has been established. ~Where 
these defendants are impoverishecl or bankrupt, some provi-
sion for assistance in their eases must be made. If such 
a situation appears ridiculous, then the must 
be imaginecl: a case in which a poor person is 
in a criminal proceeding·, with no one to defenrl 
interests. Such a picture would be at variance with 
the underlying spirit of our systrm of jurisprudence." 
(46 Jour. Crim. Law, Crim. & Pol. Sci., 199, 200, 205.) It is 
said: "Payment of appointrd counsel varit's strikingly, from 
five dollars to one thousand dollars, on the serYice 
ancl the state. A more realistic examination of this problem 
is essential if the right to counsel as extended in theory is to 
become equally substantial in practice.'' , The Right 
to Counsel in American p. 139.) And: "Payment of 
counsel is a connected with the duty to 
appoint counsel and the qualit:' of serYicc furnished by 
counsel. It is a "\Yell-established Ameriean that one 
should be paid for work done at the and for the 
benefit of, others. :\fevertlwlcss, from an 
of the legal profession, like medical in analogous 
circumstance,, have given freely of their services to those fac-
ing criminal prosecution. ~Willingness to serve for absurdly 
low fees and upon insubstantial must be classed with 
the 'volunteered' defense as evidence of legal humani-
tarianism. 
*''The author is associated with Go1·ernment and International Rela· 
tions at the University of Connecticut. He was formerly with the cor· 
responding department at Rutgers University where he had done his 
post-graduate studies. At the same time he lectured in The Dep 't 
of History and Political Science in Rutgers Univ. at Rutgers. 
His prc,·ious effort in the field of criminal law was an on 'Public 
Defenders in Connecticut,' which first State Government 
nnd was in the Congressional " ( 46 .Jour. 
Crim. Law, & Pol. Sci., 199.) 
HILL, 1!. SuPEnron CounT 
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as the practice of law has become a 
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in large cities and as the nation has moved tovvard 
and urbanization, the close contaet which 
once enjoyed with the general public haR been 
seyerely weakened. 
of defending prisoners without of pay-
seemc; unfair to most ; to some a real 
'l'heir objection is that most people will not peJ'-
form useful tasks without pay; when charitable medical care 
the answer is that doctors can give a short time 
or each week to needy individuals and still maintain 
income, whereas lawyers, once appointed, must 
all or nearly all of their time to a pending ease, some-
times with the prospeet of the trial lasting for week:,, 
"Whether resulting from the greater influence of state bar 
upon state governments or from some other cause, 
statutory provisions of a sort exist in most states for the pay-
nwnt of appointed counsel, but appointed counsel in federal 
eourts continues to go unre1varcled by Congress .... In gen-
it can be said that the payments allowed by the various 
are far below the fees which most attorneys would 
although numerous exceptions to such a statement can 
he found .... 
'' rn the absence of a statutory provision there is no duty 
a county to pay appointed counsel. This attitude is 
on the argument that the attorney is discharging a 
duty, a duty as an officer of the court, or a burden 
assmned with a lawyer's oath, or simply that there is no obli-
on the part of the county. 'l'wo exceptions to this 
are provided by the highest courts of Indiana and 
Wisconsin. In each, statutes which denied any duty of the 
t:mmties to pay attorneys appointed by the eonrt \vere held 
in n1lid. The subject of payment for appointed counsel 1vill 
receive inereased attention as the practice of 
counsel becomes n:wre general. Certainly the 
situation is highly unsatisfactory." (I d., p. 135.) 
Samuel Hub in of the Maryland Bar has this to say: ''In most 
criminal eases there is more or less unequal combat bet\Yeen 
the accused on the one hand and the forces of the state on the 
otl1er. 'fhis inequality is so glaring that it is not unusual for 
the average citizen to assert that the courts exist not for the 
of all regardless of wealth or power, bnt for the benefit 
of the fortunate few as against the many. 'rhis is especially 
true in the case of the destitute who have no adequate facilities 
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for their legal defense and for the safeguarding of their rights. 
There are no adequate legal facilities available for this pur-
pose without cost to the accused. All destitute persons charged 
with crime should be able to obtain justice in our courts. They 
should be given adequate counsel and, what is of equal 
importance, means of making investigations, in order that the 
truth in the case may be brought to the attention of the court 
and jury, and a proper verdict and sentence rendered. . .. 
''One of the weaknesses of the assignment system is the fact 
that the able and experienced lawyers do not care for such 
appointments. The system leads to abuse and favoritism if 
the attorney is compensated, and if there is no compensation 
the system has little value. There are comparatively few 
lawyers with extensive experience in criminal practice, and 
lawyers in civil practice rarely have the experience to handle 
criminal cases adequately. If the fees are small the interest 
of the attorney is only half-hearted, and he will often advise 
the client to plead guilty, giving as his reason that by avoiding 
a protracted trial the prisoner is more likely to receive leniency 
than if he enters a plea of 'not guilty'. The system rarely 
works satisfactorily .... 
"Legal assistance to the destitute in criminal cases is a 
matter affecting the well-being of the whole community. It is 
important that the innocent be adequately protected. It is 
also important that the guilty be justly treated. To this end 
the poor man charged with crime should be provided with 
adequate legal protection without cost. Such a provision will 
dissipate the idea that only the rich can avail themselves of 
their legal rights, and it will mark a notable step forward in 
the proper administration of justice throughout the country." 
(39 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 893.) The Honorable Henry P. 
Chandler, Director, Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, in discussing the representation of indigent defendants 
in criminal cases in the federal courts, says: ''But notwith-
standing the law, the practical provision for counsel in the 
case of poor persons accused of crime in the federal courts, 
is only rudimentary and inefficient, brcause there is no provi-
sion for compensating counsel appointed by the courts to 
represent such persons, or even to reimburse them for their 
ordinary expenses incurred in the defense .... 
"For approximately twenty years now the conviction has 
been growing among persons acquainted with the conduct of 
criminal cases in the federal courts, that for poor persons the 
spirit of the Sixth Amendment that persons accused of crime 
HILJJ v. SuPERIOR CouRT 17!1 
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ihc at\~'~' ol' <~ollllSPl for t IH•ir dPJ'elJ"(', is far 
fulfillr:d. In f<wl il1r; laeh of provi,;ion for r•nm. 
eonnscl appointP<1 lo defPnd pnor persons a<;eusc(l 
crime or even pa,ving; t hei1· out.nf-pneket expensetl, has 
to be regarde<l as perhaps the most serious single defect 
tlH; federal jwlieial " (28 Cal. State Bar .Jour. 
1\Ir. Harry Graham Balter, an eminent nwmber of the 
Los Angeles Bar, statrs: "To a considerable extent, in the 
courts, the traditional concept of assignment of in-
members of the Bar to represent indigent accused, 
wtt hont being compensated, bnt as a gratuitous discharge of 
th·· la·wyer's professional obligation, has gradually given 
to the more realistic concept of either (a) the Public 
, supported by taxes, (b) the Voluntary Defender, 
temed after the Public Defender System, but supported 
philanthropic funds oe by Community Chest funds, or 
( c:) appointment of counsel in a specific case, but with pro-
\"i.;;ions for reasonable compensation. In spite of the decided 
tr<'lJ(t towards more systematized representation for indigent 
that the constitutional safeguard of adequate legal 
representation does not always measure up to the standards 
~et the Supreme Court of the United States, is evidenced 
the 'flood of petitions' reaching that court, alleging de-
pYi\·ation of the accused in some of the state courts of due 
proeess of law and other constitutional rights, usually center-
around the question of proper legal representation af-
forded the accused." (Emphasis added; 24 Cal. State Bar 
,J<;ur 114.) In regard to the fees paid in other states to ap-
counsel Emery A. Brownell, a leader in the field of 
aid, states: ''Only twenty-three states provide any com-
pc·wmtion for attorneys in other than capital cases. In a 
of these states the maximum fees allowed are grossly 
u memunrrative---especially when it is considered that there 
is llO compensation for preparation before the trial except in 
\Yi~eonsin, all(l no provision for expenses except in California 
ancl \Yisconsin." (13mwnell, Legal Aid in the United States, 
p. 12±.) 
Section 987a must be viewed in the lig·ht of the foregoing 
thoughts. Manifestly its object was to assure more efficient 
and satisfactory representation of indigent defendants in 
(·J·huinal cases. 1f this court and the superior courts allow 
token fees or fees that bear no relation to the services 
performed, as does the majority here, the object of tht> 
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section defeated. 'l'hc situation that gave rise to its passage 
has been ameliorated. 
Section 987 a states that a reasonable fee should be allowed. 
'l'hat is a long known in the law and many factors 
are taken into consideration. ''The reasonableness of the fee 
or allowed must be determined like any other fact 
in issue in judicial proceeding, and in making such de-
i ermination all the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case, so far as applicable those enumerated herein 
below, must be taken into consideration. 
''In ·what is a reasonable attorney's fee or 
allowance for legal services rendered, many and varied ele-
ments or factors are to be considered. At\.mong the principal 
elements or factors to be considered are the amount and 
character of the services rendered, the nature, and importance 
of the litigation or business in which the services were ren-
dered, the degree of responsibility imposed on, or incurred 
by, the attorney, the amount of money or the value of the 
property affected by the controversy, or involved in the em-
ployment, the degree of professional ability, skill, and ex-
perience called for and exercised in the performance of the 
services, and the professional character, qualifications, and 
standing of the attorney, and also the amount recovered. 
''The labor, time, and trouble involved and expended by 
the attorney, are also elements to be considered, although 
it has been held that the element of time is of minor import-
ance, and standing alone is not a basis for compensation. 
'l'ime, in this connection, means the length of time employed 
by the attorney in preparation for, and trial of, the case, 
and not the length of the time the litigation has been per-
mitted to remain in court. . . . 
''The customary charges or fees, if any, for similar ser-
vices is an important element to be considered in determining 
the reasonable value of services rendered by an attorney, and 
not what the attorney thinks is reasonable; and speaking 
generally, in the absence of a special contract, an attorney 
is entitled to the amount that is reasonable and customary 
in the same vicinity for services of like kind, performed under 
like conditions and circumstances. Employment of an at-
torney with knowledge of his rate of charges. ·without stipu-
lating as to price, may be regarded as evidence of a con-
tract to pay at such rate; but the fact that the client, when 
informed, during the pendency of a suit, of the charges his 
attorney is making, fails to express dissatisfaction, is not an 
lDi)G I lfn,r~ v. SurEIUOR CouRT 
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and does not bind him to 11ay 
future services in the same suit. An llll-
order fixing the eompensation of an for 
rendered eannot control the amount of reeoyery 
action for such serYices. 
the 
ll\ llllll1 u lll 
assoeiation is n', but 
the reasonable Yalue of the srniees; aJH1 
of a special or implied a elient is 
not bound to pay aceorcling to the rates preseribed 
Jlw rnles and regulations of the bar assoeiation .... 
''Financial ability or of chent. TllC' financial 
of a client may be taken into consideration, not for 
the purpose of enhancing the amount above a reasonable eom-
but for the purpose of determining whether or not 
able to pay a fair and just eompensation for the services 
and as a factor in determini11g the Yalne of the attor-
or as an incident in ascertaining the importance 
of the interests ilwolYed in the litigation. The 
of a litigant is ordinarily entitled to no considera-
fixing the value of his attorney's senices, although 
sometimes be taken into consideration in fixing the 
of the legal serYires rendered." (7 C.J.S., Attorney 
§ 191 ) (2).) (See also 5 :\m .. Tnr., Attorueys at 
1D8.) (See 143 A.L.R. 672.) 1\o doubt many of those 
\Yere taken into eonsideration by the bar association 
of the county where the trial was held when it adopted a mini-
mnm fee schedule. The amount awarded here ($500 for each 
was $250 less than that minimum. 'rhe members of 
in adopting the schedule were \Yell aware of all the 
""''rhra(1 costs and other factors to be considered and which 
appropriate to the community. 'rhey knew more about 
dw~r than the courts. '!.'he schedule lists "minimum" 
fpes which means the lrast that should be charged under tlw 
mosi fayorable circumstanecs and still retain a S('mblanee of 
eon·r>]ation between the services performed and the compen-
s:u ion received. The fees here allowed are plainly inadc>quate. 
TlH: trial consnmed eight days which means an allmYance of a 
gross amount of about $6:) per (lay without allowiug anything 
fo1· retainer or fee for preparation work essential to the 
of any case to a court or jury, and no allowance 
Wil~ made for office overhead or othc>r expense in tlw prepara-L"d h•nctling of the'""" 
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The salaries paid district attorneys and public defenders 
are not a proper measure for determining the compensation 
allowable to attorneys appointed to defend those charged with 
crime. "With such positions go prestige and a certain steady 
income which may in a measure account for the difference 
between it and the cost of handling the legal work on a piece 
basis. These officials have no overhead expense as do attorneys 
engaged in private practice and all expenses incurred by such 
officials in the investigation and hand! ing of criminal cases 
arc paid out of public fum1s. Moreover, it is a matter of 
common knowledge that the salaries of government officers do 
not match what they would receive for similar work in private 
activities whether it be legal or administrative work. 
I would issue the writ on the ground that the court abused 
its discretion although I believe the order is appealable. It is 
not an order made after judgment substantially affecting the 
judgment but is a final order in a special civil proceeding 
which is made appealable by section 963, subdivision 1, of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Schauer, .J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19100. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1956.] 
GEORGE G. EICHELBERGER et al., Appellants, v. CITY 
OF BERKEJ_JEY et al., Respondents. 
LEWIS WESCO'rT, Appellant, v. CITY OF BERKELEY 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Pensions-Amount.-Where a pension statute states that the 
pension shall be a percentage of the average salary attached 
to the rank held by the employee before retirement, it is con-
strued as providing for a fluctuating pension which increases 
or decreases as the salaries paid to active employees increase 
or decrease. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Fire Department----Pensions.-Where 
a city ordinance expressly provides that pensions to retired 
firemen shall not fluetuate up or down in accordance with pay 
fluctuations of aetive firemen, retired firemen are not en-
[l] SPe Cal.Jur., Pensions, § 6; Am.Jur., PPnsions, ~§ 32, 33. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pensions, § 8; [2. il] Municipal Cor-
porations, § 324(5). 
